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The main topic here is: "Which scientist do you believe?" Few
people are likely to think of patent disputes in such a context, but the
question is often central. The subtopic is alternatives for resolving such
disputes. Here, too, it is useful to consider experience with patent (and
other intellectual property such as trade secrets) disputes. 1
Pragmatic Concerns
Does patent litigation provide a suitable return on investment? One
study provides an interesting perspective. 2 Of 152 reported cases
involving damages during 1982-92, the top five represent about 75%
of the aggregate of all amounts awarded. That leaves an average of
about $3 million per case for each of the remaining 147. If the top 25
cases are removed, the average award in the remaining 127 was slightly
over $600,000.
To average people, this is a vast sum, but major companies project
$1.5 to $5 million for out-of-pocket patent litigation costs through
trial. Lost opportunity and internal costs can far exceed this. Thus,
usually patent litigation seems to be a poor investment for winners and
worse for losers - particularly when costs must be cut to pay damages.
This can mean layoffs, research cut backs and divestitures. Such
concerns, however, are not unique to patent disputes.
* Mr. Balmer is Chief Patent Counsel, Union Carbide Corporation and has been
very much involved with alternative dispute resolution. He received his B.S. (Chemical
Engineering) from Pennsylvania State University and his J.D. from the George
Washington University National Law Center.
1 See also, Arbitration of Patent and Other Technological Disputes, 18(4) Idea
(1976) (contains sixteen papers, including one by Arthur Kantrowitz). [Ed.]
2 Ronald Coolley, Overview and Statistical Study of the Law on Patent Damages,
75 J. Patent & Trademark Office Socy 515 (1993).
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Why does patent litigation occur? Why do so many disputes
progress through litigation, only to be settled after the expenditure of
handsome sums of money?
The answer to these questions is not necessarily that patent owners
and alleged patent infringers are insane, or that parties are so swayed by
litigation counsel that they do not see the forest for the trees. More
likely, parties cannot resolve the dispute themselves. We have always
looked to others to settle disputes. As children, spats among siblings
were referred to the highest authority, Mom. The power of Mom as a
negotiating tool was not lost on me or my siblings. Going to Mom was
a negotiating strategy that we honed to a fine skill. In the right
environment, it evoked sheer panic and sought compromise.
The threat of litigation can have similar effects. Litigation brings
cost pressure to bear. Discovery converts suspicions into knowledge,
and emotions have time to wane during the long and tedious litigation
process. Litigation can thus be a useful, but expensive, tool to achieve
settlement, and if necessary, resolve a dispute.
But this may only be effective if both parties can afford to go to the
mat. It is not surprising that less pecunious patent owners are upset after
spending tens if not hundreds of thousands of dollars, often their life
savings, before reaching the initial stages of litigation.
A patent court in which the judges have not only familiarity with
the law but also with technology has often been suggested. A dispute
involving an improvement to a catalyst would then not require
educating the judge about what a catalyst is - or even what chemicals
and chemical reactions are. An alternative is to use technically trained
arbitrators, but at one time this was frowned on by the courts.
Technical issues arise in other fields of law, e.g., environment, toxic
tort and medical malpractice. However, there is little pressure for
specialized courts, and, at least in private disputes, the capacity to use
binding arbitration seems never to have been questioned. What is
unique about patent disputes? There are several answers.
Balme. ADR in Patent Controversies 147
Distinctions Between Patent and Other Disputes
Public Policy
Patents and other intellectual property - trademarks, copyrights,
trade secrets and know-how, - can be characterized as a right to
prevent others from doing something. Intellectual property need not be
technology-based to have commercial effects. Anyone who uses "Big
Mac" to describe a hamburger without MacDonalds' permission; copies
"The Client" without Bantam-Doubleday's permission; or makes, uses
or sells a product covered by claims of a patent without permission,
infringes. In this regard, intellectual property rights are parallel to those
in real estate: Owners can prevent trespassing.
Why should intellectual property have more "public policy"
implications than real estate? Unlike real estate, denial of access to
intellectual property can have significant costs. If you deny me
permission to picnic on your land, I can find another place. Yes, real
estate can have a unique value such as at 46th and Park Avenue in
Manhattan, but it has only a local effect. In contrast, intellectual
property can have nationwide, if not worldwide, impact.
Creative businesses seek to leverage intellectual property, and
sometimes something less, into profits. With intellectual property you
may be able to put competitors out of business. This is where antitrust
can come into play. The Department of Justice for nearly one-half
century has issued Guidelines addressing intellectual property misuse.
Also, procurement of a patent through fraud led to a violation of § 2 of
the Sherman Act (monopolizing or attempting to monopolize). 3 That
the Sherman Act can be enforced with criminal penalties demonstrates
that it involves more than purely private interests, but even antitrust
cases are increasingly viewed as arbitrable.4
For several years, arbitration of patent disputes was also viewed with
hostility. For instance, Judge William Conner, likely to be the only
former patent attorney now siting as a federal district court judge, held
3 Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery and Chemical Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965).
4 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985). See also, Syscom International Corp. v. SynOptics Communications, Inc.,
(E.D.N.Y, No. CV94-2025, June 28, 1994).
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that arbitration was inappropriate for resolution of patent validity
disputes. 5 Yet, it seems that attention to nonparty impacts served
little purpose beyond permitting parties to renege on their obligations.
Those arguing "public policy" were moved not by altruistic concerns
but a desire for a possibly more favorable forum. In any case, the patent
profession sought and obtained Congressional relief.
Legislation now permits parties to arbitrate patent validity,6 but
the Patent and Trademark Office must be notified of awards. To put
things into perspective, consider that parties who arbitrate antitrust
claims have no statutory obligation to inform the Department of Justice
- even if an antitrust violation is found. Could it be that individuals
involved in patent disputes are less trustworthy than those involved in
antitrust disputes? It is hard to see why.
Characteristics ofPatentAttorneys
Another difference helps explain why patent disputes are unique.
Unlike most attorneys involved in disputes turning on issues of science
or technology, patent attorneys have their upbringing in engineering
and science.
Thus, they attack the law with exacting precision that only a
scientist or engineer can understand or tolerate. Perhaps the only reason
that the arbitrability of patent, but not antitrust, disputes is treated by
statute resides in patent attorneys' desire for precision and their lack of
patience in sorting out policy in the courts.
Also, most lawyers and judges lack technical training and know
little or nothing about intellectual property, particularly patents. Thus,
patent lawyers may be more concerned (than lawyers without technical
training) about having disputes resolved by judges unfamiliar with both
relevant law and technolgy. They may also be more concerned about
trying cases before jurors who have, at best, great difficulty deciding
which set of scientists or engineers to believe. This is why "alternative
dispute resolution" (ADR) can have a major role to play.
5 Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 440 F.Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
6 P.L. 97-247 § 17, 96 Star. 322-23 (1982) (inserting § 294 into 35 U.S.C. (the
patent statute)).
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Alternative Dispute Resolution
What is ADR? At least in the context of patent litigation, it is any
mechanism for parties to resolve their dispute other than through
traditional court litigation. It is anything that you want it to be; it can
be very simple or complex. ADR can involve full discovery, testimony
before several arbitrators and a right to appeal. It can even be limited-
scope litigation. ADR can occur anywhere between the time the parties'
realize a dispute exists and the time that the winning party is satisfied
or the loser has exhausted appeals.
Parties can design whatever process they mutually desire. There is
no cookie cutter. What works in one situation may fail in another.
Attorneys are of value to clients because they know the rules. ADR
gives attorneys the additional advantage of being able to make rules
that maximize opportunity for success in light of party relationships,
the internal dynamics of each party, and the nature of the dispute,
including the fact issues.
Broad types of ADR beg for tailoring. These range from non-
assisted discussions through mediation, neutral fact finders, case
exposure (such as mini-trials), arbitration (binding and non-binding)
and limited issue litigation.
Even non-facilitated discussions can be tailored. They may involve
the exchange of information on a confidential or nonconfidential basis.
The parties can establish the individuals who will participate to assure
that a decision maker is present (or to avoid the presence of a political
roadblock).
In mediation, neutrals may be passive or can beat up parties in
trying almost literally to hammer out a resolution. Should the mediator
have the choice?
In fact finding, a neutral can peek under each tent without the
other party's gaining access to sensitive technical or commercial
information.
With case exposure, generally each party can present its case to the
decision maker for the other party. Such proceedings include mini-
trials and give decision makers an opportunity to verify what they have
heard from their attorneys - or their business or technical personnel.
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Arbitration is getting a neutral party or panel (members may not
always be neutral) to reach a decision on facts, law or both. It can be,
e.g., binding or nonbinding, administered (by an ADR organization) or
not, and appealable or nonappealable. The arbitrator(s) can have the
power to order discovery or not. A decision can be "bare" or reasoned.
The scope of possible award can be unlimited (including penalties,
attorney costs and enhanced damages) or, as in "baseball" arbitration,
restricted to picking one of the party's offers, nothing else.
Limited issue litigation uses courts, but the parties agree to limit
legal or factual issues to ones they cannot resolve through negotiation.
For instance, a setdement may require certain payments (or refunds) of
royalties depending on whether a patent claim is found invalid on
specified grounds. This permits focused litigation with conventional
procedures and appeals.
ADR Works
Nineteen of twenty court actions are resolved before trial. That is
only the tip of the iceberg - many disputes are resolved without a
complaint being filed. While many are resolved through negotiation,
assisted mechanisms can play a role. In many cases, parties have
resolved disputes quickly, confidentially, inexpensively and
satisfactorily by using assisted or unassisted ADR.
But ADR success is far from universal. Like beauty, success is in the
eye of the beholder. If the process does not meet party expectations, it
is viewed as a failure.
I submit that failures are not attributable to ADR but rather its
inappropriate use and unrealistic expectations. The parties may, for
example, try mediation before either knows the bottom line. Also, if
parties are in a "bet your company" dispute, they are very unlikely to
forego traditional litigation willingly.
If party objectives are to "save money," "avoid the vagaries of the
judicial system," "obtain a decision from individuals knowledgeable in
the technology and law," "rapidly reach resolution of a dispute," or
"maintain a good relationship," I suggest that ADR will be a "failure"
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to one or both. Successful ADR depends on whether the parties have
the ability and willingness to resolve a dispute. If either is missing, ADR
can be an expensive mistake. Even if parties have a mutual, good faith
desire to resolve a dispute, they will be dissatisfied if the procedure is
not well thought out or inappropriate for the circumstances.
Timing is also important. For instance, early negotiation may fail,
whereas, on the eve of trial (when parties have a better understanding of
each other's cases, have already spent considerable money and
anticipate spending far more), negotiation can easily succeed.
Private Resolution of Cases with Policy Implications
How should we perceive parties using private neutrals to resolve
disputes with potential societal impacts? Judge Posner, in a copyright
case, said:7 "[T]here is no reason to think that arbitrators are more
likely to err... than state or federal judges are." Indeed, it seems less
likely: Parties are not going to select individuals off the street. In patent
cases, neutrals are likely to be recognized legal experts who also have
experience in the disputed technology.
The court system allows for appeal, but appeal from decisions by
arbitrators is usually very limited. Judges defer to arbitrator's awards,
including those made without opinion. Some judges have bent over
backwards to uphold awards by imputing that the arbitrator gave full
consideration to unmentioned issues. 8
Arbitration sometimes offers more capable fora for addressing some
technological and legal issues. It might not exist without the threat
imposed by the nonconsensual court system. One should recognize that
few cases enter and complete the full course of judicial dispute
resolution. Most that do not are resolved privately, regardless of public
implications.
Disputes can affect society as a whole, not just individuals, but
balancing must occur. Notwithstanding occasionally sharp criticism of
plea bargaining, for example, we cannot afford to have every dispute
resolved by litigation.
7 Saturday Evening Post Corp. v. Rumbleseat Press Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1197 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Judge Posner).
8 See, e.g., Saturday Evening Post, supra.
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Risks of error are inevitable whatever the procedure. If a loser in
ADR can use the "public" interest to advantage, the dispute will be
publicly scrutinized. If there is merit to a claim that the public interest
is not being served, one way or another, any private solution is almost
sure to be overturned.
Finally, we should consider that merely having disputes resolved is
often as important as the resolution itself. Life can then march on.
